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Hatred, fear, and disdain—these are emotions that drive conflict protagonists to commit
acts of violence against their adversaries. With such emotions, reason is minimized and replaced
by fabricated notions about the enemy’s threats, intentions, and character replace facts about the
dangerous “other”. Conventional thinking about the protagonists’ emotional life assumes their
psychic world is cut off fundamentally from the objective realm about the conflict. Such a realm
includes power relations among conflicting groups. Such power relations illustrate the inherent
duality of their objective power relations and the subjectivity of emotions.
However, such conventional thinking regarding this duality between emotions and power
cannot explain the following: the manifestation of certain moral emotions under certain social
conditions constitutes a social-psychological force that intersects with the conflict dynamics. The
exertion of such a force has the potential to induce, motivate, lure, compel or overwhelm conflict
actors. In many conflict settings, the release of such a force is a political act, with the potential to
mobilize conflict actors to take up arms against their adversary. Such a force reflects a
manifestation of affect power. Reflecting the integration of power dynamics and the actors’
emotional life, affect power manifests itself in the public performatives where people gather,
debate, deliberate, cheer, jeer, and sometimes fight. Such power is also embodied in the emotions
of those who experience power’s effect, as if the force of such power is inscribed on the bodies
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of those affected. Over time, the repetition of experiencing such a force affects the body if the
body is being trained—or domesticated—to react in certain ways. One insidious form of such
power consists of state-sponsored campaigns designed to control the minds and lives of targeted
population groups. Such campaigns deploy techniques designed to instill in such group members
a sense of their inferiority, as if they are lesser beings, morally, politically, and socially. These
are techniques designed to instill a sense of debasement within the minds of such groups for
disciplinary control, reflecting the power to exploit emotional vulnerabilities of targeted
population groups.
In this paper, I examine the entanglement of certain emotions and power relations among
actors immersed in protracted violence. Central to my arguments are the recent findings in social
psychology regarding the complexity of moral emotions as they are experienced as a contagious
force in conflict settings. Section 1 summarizes these findings. In section 2, I develop certain
themes regarding the inter-linkages between the conflict actors’ emotional life and their power
relations. The notion of affect power is developed. In section 3, I present two case studies of
affect power, which center on elements of structurally violent systems. I conclude with a
summary regarding the implications of this emotion-power entanglement for conflict analysis. I
recommend conflict analysts abandon the alleged distinction between the subjectivity of social
psychological constructions, such as notions of identity and difference, and the objectivity of
power dynamics that represent external drivers of conflict.

1. Aggression and Emotions
The centrality of emotions to the outbreak and prolongation of protracted violence is a
subject of enormous scholarly research (see Kemper, 1990; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Petersen,

3
2002; Rimé & Christophe, 1997). From its nascent years as a distinct profession to the most
current investigations, psychology has given prominence to the link between emotions and
aggression. Most of the findings regarding the emotional underpinnings of aggression rest on a
notion of linear causality, according to which those situational factors that foster an individual to
experience emotional arousal tend to foster their aggression. This linearity takes the following
form: environmental social conditions  emotional arousal  aggressive behavior. Freud
focused on the social conditions of modern life that tend to repress the release of unconscious
instinctual drives for pleasure. Rejecting any appeal to the unconscious, behaviorist oriented
psychologists focused on situational factors and observable emotional reactions. For example,
Leonard Berkowitz explained aggression through his frustration-reaction theory, according to
which individuals are prone to aggress when they react with emotionally charged frustration to
certain harsh situational factors of their lives, such as the deprivation of their basic elemental
needs (Berkowitz, 1990).1 In the burgeoning studies of neuroscience, aggression is explained as a
neurological reaction to those stimuli that overwhelm an individual’s cognitive function and
activate the amygdala. Some neurological studies show that the psychic pain of social rejection
increases anger, which in turn fosters aggressive behavior (Leary, Tweng & Quinlivan, 2006; see
also Gaertner et al., 2008, and Warburton, Williams & Cairns, 2006).
Representing a major development in the psychology of aggression, the General
Aggression Model gives due attention to multiple sorts of factors, including emotions. The
model’s architects explain aggression through a combination of distal causes—biological,

Although enormous attention among psychologists has been given to Philip Zimbardo’s famous
1971 study of aggression, such a study was not designed to examine the causal impact of
emotions on the tendency towards violence. But clearly the experimental subjects who acted as
prisoners exhibited intense expressions of anger, frustration, and rage as a reaction to their
treatment by the prison guards.
1
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environmental, and personality factors—and proximate causes that include situational and social
encounters. With this model, an individual’s reaction to both distal and proximate causes is
spontaneous, uncontrolled, and unintentional. Emotional arousal is strongly influenced by an
individual’s knowledge structure, which in turn rests on their perceptions of others,
interpretations of experiences, and their own behaviors (Allen, et al., 2018).
Yet, a growing body of social scientific research shows that the emotions that foster
aggression are not reducible to an individual’s subjective reaction to environmental and
biological factors. Such emotions are inherently social experiences that rest upon interpersonal
relationships, social influences, and mechanisms of group bonding (Harré, 1986; Nussbaum,
2001, Chapter 1; Armon-Jones, 1986). At the macro-level, the sociality of emotion is a driving
force for intragroup connectivity. As I illustrate below, a nation experiences intense collective
emotions in times of war, including fear of enemy attack, grief at the loss of fallen heroes, and
joy at the nation’s victory.
To probe this topic of the sociality of emotions in relation to aggression, I offer the
following three themes from recent findings in social psychology, conflict analysis, and political
science.
A. Moral Emotions. Many emotional experiences are inherently moralistic. They are
inseparable from the landscape of our mental and social lives and thoroughly suffused with a
sense of one’s moral relations with others, as Martha Nussbaum shows (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 1).
Underpinning certain positive moral emotions is a sense of caring for the well-being of others
that another person or group will survive, thrive or flourish. For example, the emotion of grief at
the loss of a loved one constitutes a moral response to such loss. Such a response is effused with
valuation in two respects—first, the value of the person who has left or died, and second, the
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value of the relationship between the griever and the person lost (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 31). Grief
is a long-term disposition, as is feeling homesick, distressed, enthusiastic, and sorry for oneself.
Extending beyond a momentary feeling, grief extends over time. We would not say “I grieved
for 10 minutes, but now I am over it,” although we might say “I grieved for two years, but then
moved beyond that.”
In general, moral emotions intersect with cognitive function regarding the social bonds
and breaks with others. As Jonathan Haidt writes, moral emotions as those “that are linked to the
interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or
agents” (Haidt, 2003, p. 853). Such emotions rest upon positive or negative normative
evaluations of others. Anger, contempt, and disdain are clustered together, like a family of
emotions that are experienced as negative responses to the actions of others (Haidt, 2003, p.
855). For example, anger tends to prompt attacks against others based on a moral judgment that
someone, possibly oneself, is being treated unfairly by others (Berkowitz & Heimer, 1989).
Underpinning an angry reaction is a sense of a moral bond between the angry person and those
who are, or were, presumably attacked or threatened. Such a bond reflects a sense of caring for
the threatened person who presumably deserves protection. Of course, anger can spread, as in
cases where an entire family can experience anger at another family from a single incident of
attack across family lines.
B. Enculturation. Experiences of anger, contempt, and disgust reflect the social norms.
Certain moral emotions become embedded in the ethos of society, reflecting the effect of socially
sanctioned value judgments about morally right and wrong actions, good and bad life conditions,
and virtuous or vicious character trains. Such enculturation can be understood by three themes
regarding the emotional and cultural spheres of one’s life (Armon-Jones, 1986).
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(i) Emotions are always about something, that is, reactions to the concrete world of
observed behaviors, patterns of practices, and social settings (Harré, 1986, p. 4). Such reactions
transcend one’s subjective psychic states. To feel fear is to react to a perceived threat, sensing
danger to oneself, or to those with whom one is emotionally attached. In like measure,
experiences of anger, rage, or bitterness constitute embodied reactions to the perceived
behaviors—past, present or future—of others. Even for those emotional reactions that trigger
psycho-physiological processes, such as sudden fright, such reactions are not reducible
completely to such processes.
(ii) Immersion in a cultural community influences one’s emotional reactions
significantly. Such immersion includes the impact of shared values, beliefs, and expectations on
one’s emotional responses. Through development of socialization skills, one’s emotional habitus
is formed, which means one acquires tendencies to react emotionally in ways that largely
conform to the culture’s norms. For example, as girls and boys become encultured in a particular
religious community, they acquire the skills of proper emotional reactions to rituals, ceremonies,
and sermons. Such enculturation reveals the impact of social identity. According to intergroup
emotions theory, one’s emotional experiences are determined more by a sense of social identity,
based on the identity category that defines their sense of self, than by interpersonal dynamics
(Miller et al., 2004; Smith, 1993). Researchers have shown that the emotions determined by
one’s affiliation in a particular categorical group, such as a faith tradition, differ from those
activated by interpersonal relationships (Mackie & Smith, 1998; Van Zomeren et al., 2010).
Additionally, the types of categorization-based emotions tend to be shared among members of a
given categorical group, which shows that categorization-based emotions are based on grouprather than individual-level appraisals (Crisp et al., 2007).
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(iii) From such enculturation, an emotional experience has a prescriptive function
regarding the standards for evaluation by one’s community. Certain emotions are expected,
encouraged, and sometimes rewarded under particular social situations. The emotions reflect the
culturally sanctioned normalized value judgments, in which case emotions vary with such
judgements. For example, in certain non-Western societies, the emotional experiences of
individuals represent a sense of the relationship between a person and an event involving other
people (Lutz, 1986).
C. Emotional Contagion. With this enculturation of emotions in society, the emotionally
charged performances spread like a contagion from individuals to individuals and groups to
groups.2 Emotional contagion occurs through a process of social mimicry, where one emotional
response to witnessing someone’s behavior, such as physical violence, triggers a similar
emotional response in individuals or groups.3 Certain emotions are given social primacy in
specific settings; the emotions tend to be anticipated, expected, and normalized. Certain shared
emotions take on a normative quality; under the appropriate conditions, such emotions are
encouraged, expected, and validated (Heaney, 2011, p. 271). For example, a public expression of
grief—bowed head, somber tone and possibly tearing-up—is expected when attending a funeral.
A violation of such expectation, such as in the form of boisterous laughter, would prompt others

Regarding the force of public performances, Pierre Bourdieu writes: “Symbolic force, that of a
performative utterance, and especially of an order, is a form of power which is exercised on
bodies, directly, and as if by magic, without any physical constraint; but the magic works only on
the basis of previously constituted disposition is, which it ‘triggers’ like springs” (Bourdieu,
1997, p. 169).
3
According to Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, emotional contagion consists of “the phenomenon
of having one person's emotions and related behaviors directly trigger similar emotions and
behaviors in other people. Emotions can be shared across individuals in many different ways both
implicitly and explicitly. For instance, conscious reasoning, analysis and imagination have all been
found to contribute to the phenomenon” (Hatfield et al., 1993, pp. 96-97).
2
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to express disapproval or scorn for the offender. The inherently contextual aspects of emotional
contagion imply a social geography of emotions, according to which certain public spaces are
tied socially to norms for exhibiting emotions (Davidson & Milligan, 2004).
Emotional contagion need not require direct observation of someone’s emotional
behavior. Speeches of political leaders, public demonstrations, and social media feeds can trigger
it, many of which showcase intense positive or negative emotions (Kramer et al., 2012). In many
conflict contexts, emotional contagion is evident in many media stories about the threats of
enemy attack. From a socio-functional approach to threats, different groups pose distinct types of
threats, which evoke definitive and functional emotional reactions based on the need to protect
group resources or social structures. Stories of fear, hatred, and anger are often intensified with
reference to the collective memory that ancestors have of past tragedies. Such stories can put
individuals in a fever pitch of rage that can promote calls for violence against the enemy
(Hatfield & Rapson, 1986, pp. 130-2). In some conflict contexts, such memory seems to foster a
chronic a sense of intra-group bonding driven by a share fear of a perceived enemy. In such
cases, the shared chronic fear of an enemy attack can be habituated through various socialization
processes (Bar-Tal, 2013, p. 219-222).4 For example, in Israeli society the shared perceptions of
a threatening enemy and threatened allies are elevated to cardinal categories that define the
social-political order of the Middle East (Bar-Tal, 2001). Such emotions have the effect of
motivating calls for vigilance vanquishing the enemy.
With stories of the enemy’s evil-doings come emotionally charged glorifications of the
nation’s heroes. The nation’s generals are likened to gods, the flag evokes a sense of collective

As Daniel Bar-Tal writes, shared emotions are “the stimulator, interpreter, motivator, energizer,
director, and controllers of various social-psychological processes related to the dynamics of the
intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal, 2013, p. 213).
4

9
pride, and they sing national hymns with religious fervor. In war-time propaganda, a victorious
battle becomes consecrated, as if rising symbolically above the tide of sequential events to be
fixed in mythic time. In such a battle, the warriors are worshipped for their love of country and
steely control of their innermost sentiments, such as fear. The warrior is expected to complete the
mission despite pain, fear, personal hatred of superiors, or risks to personal safety.
In sum, social emotions are moralistic, enculturated, and contagious. All of which raises a
question about the nature of an emotional experience regarding how it is manifested and even
where it is located. One does not have a moral emotion; a moral emotion is not reducible to a
private psychic state sealed off from one’s social life. Moral emotions do not retain a fixed
“location” as either individualistic or collectivist. One experiences a moral emotion through its
“movement” back and forth, depending on changes in the social settings, influential forces, and
perceptions. To capture this variability of such emotions, I offer a model that undermines the
conventional dichotomy in the realization and location of a moral emotion. The model consists
of a two-dimension Vygotsky space, which is an abstraction of a moral emotion’s possible
locations and possible manifestations (Harré, 1984, p. 113). This space is defined by two
dimensions: first, a dimension of location of emotion on a continuum of the individual or
collective domains, and second, a dimension of the ways in which an emotion is manifested on a
continuum of social and the personal.
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Figure 1
Vygotsky space of Emotions
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One axis of such a space consists of the personal-social continuum of the emotion’s
realization, that is, how it is manifested. Yet, under certain conditions, one’s personal
(individualistic) realization blends with socialization processes subject to changing experiences,
circumstances, and normative practices. For example, the prolonged grief over the death of a
loved one can represent an individual’s pain that is manifested during private moments without
outward expression. While in other contexts it is displayed outwardly, such as through crying
while looking at a picture of the deceased. Grief is neither always private, nor always public.
In a radically different context, a nation’s shared sorrow at learning that their valiant
heroes experienced a major defeat on the battlefield can be manifested differently over time.

11
While the first few days after such a defeat may include the public display of sorrow with
participation at a funeral procession to honor such heroes, in later years such sorrow can be
exhibited through construction of monuments and museum displays. And such
institutionalization of a nation’s emotion depends on if the nation was ultimately defeated.
The model’s second axis consists of a continuum of the emotion’s location. As moral
emotions are manifested through speech acts, gestures, and physical markers, they are variously
individualistic and collectivist. For example, the collective sorrow that a nation experiences in
the early days of a military defeat can become magnified for some people as they learn their
loved ones died in battle. Under such conditions, the individual-collective location changes with
such a realization. In such a case, one’s individualistic manifestation of an emotion could
intensify even as the collectivist emotion of sorrow recedes.
2. Affect Power
The social emotions presented are interlinked with the expression of political power. This
has been demonstrated by a growing number of scholars in international relations. Rejecting
attempts by classical realism to reduce decision making by political leaders to a rational
calculation of costs and benefits, the architects of this turn towards emotions have shown a
nation’s collective anger, revenge, and fear can impact decisions regarding war and peace. In
particular, such emotions are tied strongly to the invocation of national symbols (S. Kaufman,
2006). In war’s lead-up or aftermath, the invocation by conflict protagonists of iconic symbols—
flags, anthems, parades—serves as an emotional reaffirmation of the glories of the nation’s past,
seeking to induce civilians to sacrifice in the ‘good violence’ against the nation’s foes. Even
pacifist symbols, such as religious crosses, stars and crescents, have been charged with warlike
meanings about the moral imperatives to vanquish enemies. With the militaristic symbols of war,
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the category of the enemy is experienced with emotional intensity regarding a sense of fear,
contempt, and repulsion.
Of course, political theorists of the past recognize the centrality of mass emotions in
political power. Thomas Hobbes found that human beings are driven by negative emotions such
as jealousy, greed, and anger. For Hobbes, the political leaders—the Leviathan—must suppress
their natural urge to act on such emotions by instilling fear in their political subjects. Hobbes
found inspiration in Niccolò Machiavelli’s declaration that the prince should rule through cruelty
or kindness, although it is “better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both” (Machiavelli,
2005, pp. 55-56). In stark contrast, Jean Jacques Rousseau adopted the idyllic notion of the state
of nature where inhabitants are gentle, honest, and happy.
Recent contributors to this resurrection in emotions give special attention to the power
that influences, and is influenced by, a nation’s emotional consciousness during times of
interstate war (Maéva and Sangar, 2018). A leading figure in this emotional turn, Richard Lebow
shows how many interstate wars are driven by the lure of revenge. Such revenge is driven by a
collective anger the nation has lost its international standing, typically because of losing territory
from a previous war (Lebow, 2010, pp. 185 and 202). With such wars of revenge, emotional
sentiments contort political leaders’ rational deliberation about war’s costs and benefits.
Besides revenge, many interstate wars are intensified by the nation’s sense of honor that
is violated and shame that is felt.5 In particular, a sense of collective disgrace at a nation’s past
military defeats serves as a prelude to many cases of mass violence.6 For example, in the early
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I thank Jonathan Kotra for his research findings on these important figures in international
relations.
6
Donald Kagan describes this sense of national disgrace in the prelude to war “as the search for
fame and glory; the desire to escape shame, disgrace and embarrassment; the wish to avenge a
wrong and thereby to restore one's reputation; the determination to behave in accordance with
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days of World War II, Adolf Hitler rationalized his military campaign against France as redress
for Germany’s humiliation from the terms of the Versailles Treaty. For the Allies, the United
States entered this war with a sense of national disgrace over Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor, which U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt characterized as an “unprovoked and dastardly
attack.” Following World War II, the honor-shame dynamic drove many revolutionary
movements in Africa and Asia that sought liberation from colonial domination. These
revolutionary leaders captured the collective fury of colonized people, as they railed against
colonial rulers for having stolen their material property, natural resources, and collective soul.
Such fury is conjoined with a love of the nation that seems as natural as one’s religion or even
one’s skin color (Anderson 1983, p. 143). For example, Mao Zedong invoked repeatedly the
national disgrace of “The Century of Humiliation,” when Western military forces defeated the
Qing forces in the First Opium War in 1842. Mao Zedong invoked China’s historic vulnerability
to Western powers in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The nation’s lament
over “The Century of Humiliation” continues to this day.
What is the character of this political power that affects the nation’s sentiments? To
address this question, we should avoid the tendency exhibited in some academic quarters in
objectifying political power. For classical realists in international relations, political power is
real, measurable, and subject to rational controls by free-thinking agents. Power is virtually
axiomatic to the existence of the state; states survive or perish based on how they acquire, secure,
retain, use, share, or lose power in their relations with other states (Morgenthau, 1985, Chapter

certain moral ideals. Although concepts of what is honorable and dishonorable can vary over
time and place, sometimes superficially and sometimes deeply, and although other people's ideas
of honor, especially those of an earlier time, can seem silly or outmoded, such surface variations
often conceal a fundamental similarity or even identity” (1997).
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1).7 Like a commodity, state power can be possessed, owned, manipulated, and transferred, as
least according to classical realists.
This objectification of political power, or power generally, is mistaken. I offer a
pragmatic perspective that locates political power in fields of practices. As Pierre Bourdieu
notes, a field creates the landscape of practices that are guided by socially sanctioned norms,
such as explicit rules of the organization, commands by institutions directors, and public
principles that guide the institution’s operations (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). In general, a
field of practice is a macro-space of interactions influenced by external social norms and internal
tendencies for the player to act in certain ways. The political field is both a field of forces in
which individuals or groups can influence, and it is also a field of struggles over access to such
forces regarding who has and does not have access to such forces (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 171).8 So,
the power of political leaders to impact the national mood comprises fields of practices.
The fields of practice associated with affect power are determined by the three factors
presented above regarding social emotions. For example, the practices of instilling fear, hatred,
and anger among the nation’s population in the lead-up to war reveal three themes of morality,
enculturation, and contagion that define social emotions.
First, the sort of emotions that reflect the affect power of conflict protagonists are steeped
in moral sentiments. These emotions are deeply moralistic. In times of war, many political
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There is an element of triviality in the claim that power relations define international relations.
The notion that states interact with each other through the capacity to exert a force—social,
political or economic—is like claiming that states interact as a result of their capacity to interact,
that is, a capacity to exert a force.
8
Pierre Bourdieu writes that any political field “produces an effect of censorship by limiting the
universe of political discourse, and thereby the universe of what is politically thinkable, to the
finite space of discourses capable of being produced or reproduced within the limits of the
political problematic” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 172).
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leaders rejoice in the expression of love for the nation, adoration for heroes, and proclamations
of the just cause. The agent of such power rationalizes their power with a strong sense of being
self-righteous, that their motives are pure, the cause is just, and their decisions are morally
sound. Not reducible to a rational calculus of costs and benefits, such self-righteousness is
charged with emotional meaning. Second, such political power to affect the nation’s mood
becomes enculturated through repetition of threat narratives that draw upon normative positions
of ‘us’ and ‘them.’ As the enemy’s threats become repeated in narratives of their brutality, they
are positioned as inherently vicious. Such positioning stands in stark contrast to the essential
virtue of the ingroup nation, which is evident in ‘our’ just cause and in the acts of good violence.
Such a polarity of positioning is layered in emotionally charged images that invoke hate,
loathing, and anger at the enemy (Sy et al., 2005). Third, the force of such affect power by the
nation’s leaders can spread like a contagion through society. For example, political dictators
proclaiming the just cause in the war against an enemy routinely proclaim their love of the nation
and hatred of the enemy. Sometimes, such leaders portray themselves as the nation’s moral
compass where “their” love of the nation and hate for the enemy is taken to mimic the emotional
sentiments of the nation. With such mimicry, the political leaders represent the nation’s
emotional surrogates.
Consider state-sponsored propaganda designed to galvanize public support for the just
cause, to prepare them for the sacrifices that lay ahead, and to take up arms against the nation’s
foe (Dojčinović, 2012, pp. 26-27). Such propaganda combines rhetorical trickery and
emotionally riveting imagery. Such a combination in at least four techniques: (1) the enemy’s
malice can ‘spread’ from one or a few persons to many, until an entire group is stigmatized as
dangerous, threatening, or depraved. (2) A single episode recounted of a perpetrator’s action to
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his/her intentions, character traits, or essential being; (3) a transition from neutral ‘factual’
information about the perpetrator’s actions to normative judgments; (4) a transition from the past
to the present, or from the present to the future. Through such techniques, a story about one
person is extended to another, from one person’s character traits to another’s traits, and from
some individuals of a group to the group itself.
For example, in the prelude to the genocidal violence of 1994 in Rwanda, Hutu
extremists implemented a propaganda campaign that advanced a dominant narrative about Tutsi
wickedness. This campaign included character assassinations of individual Tutsis, stories of past
atrocities, and narratives of Tutsi plans for conquest. The affect power of such a narrative is
obvious in the repulsive animal images of Rwandan Tutsis as vermin, snakes, and cockroaches.
A Hutu-controlled journal called Kangura published the following so-called history of Tutsi
domination.
The first inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa, followed by the Hutu in the 7th century. A
long time after, the Tutsi infiltrated and quickly took power by a system of vassalage
based on the cow. Power was monarchical and feudal, and the other ethnic groups were
reduced to servitude; abused at will and exploited without mercy. The regime was
oppressive and bloody. For example, the queen mother Kanjogera, in order to rise from
her seat, would lean on two swords planed in the shoulders of two Hutu children
(Chrétien et al., 1995, p. 110).
This text moves from the historical concepts of vassalage and servitude to the more
repulsive images of the evil queen mother striking Hutu children with her swords. Such imagery
castigates Tutsis as degenerates, and establishes the immoral imperative to protect the nation’s
good—meaning “pure”—people. One Hutu killer who was later imprisoned for his crimes
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rationalized his actions as follows: “We called them ‘cockroaches,’ an insect that chews up
clothing and nests in it, so you have to squash them hard to get rid of them. We didn’t want any
more Tutsis on the land” (Hatzfeld, 2005, p. 231).
Affect power is situated in the micro-processes of all social relations in a political space.9
In any social encounter, certain individuals are socially positioned in ways that affords them a
certain power over others. To accentuate this point, I offer a model designed to integrate moral
emotion with affect power, as presented in Figure 2.

9

While Michel Foucault does directly address the notion of affect power, his notion that power
is infused in all social relations, in the micro-processes of interactions, is perfectly suited for
affect power (see Foucault, 1990, p. 94).
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Figure 2

Vygotsky Space of Affect Power
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Figure 1 captures the location and realization of social emotions, whereas Figure 2 includes the
third dimension of power in a political field. Again, such power constitutes a contested capacity
to influence others in a political field.
Despite the examples presented above of war-time propaganda, affect power is not
always nefarious, malicious, or destructive. Such power is not equivalent to domination.
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Consider the practices of soft power in a minister’s sermons to her congregation. The feelings of
joy in celebrating a wedding or sorrow in shared grief during a funeral carry with them a
capacity to bring people together by intensifying bonds among participating members of the
community. Such emotions are situated in region 2, which reflects a collectivist location and
social manifestation. The symbolic message of such practices is that “we” walk through life
together by sharing our laughter and tears as we walk through life together, step by step and arm
in arm without fear or loathing of “you.” In a protracted violent conflict, I believe certain
practices of peacebuilding reflect a positive emotion of compassion (Rothbart & Allen, 2019).
Such practices are represented in the model in region 2.

3. Case Studies
The close juxtaposition of moral emotions and political power offers important
implications for structural violence. Such violence is driven by mechanisms of power designed to
solidify or enhance structural inequities of various social-political systems. Such mechanisms are
depersonalized; they operate regardless of the intentionality of individual leaders, administrators,
or bureaucrats. Johan Gatling identifies four mechanisms of power (Galtung, 1975). First,
exploitation, that consists of the capacity to generate systematic distraction of net benefits, as in
cases of managers expropriating the financial resources their workers deserve. Second,
penetration, that refers to a capacity to get ‘under the skin’ of those doing the exploiting by
contorting the consciousness of the underdogs. Third, fragmentation, which refers to the power
to separate the exploited population groups from one another, to diminish their capacity to act
together in ways that enhance their collective strength. Fourth, marginalization, which is the
capacity of the exploiters to create a classification system for a rank ordering—socially and
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politically—of the population groups, while ensuring the categorical supremacy of society’s top
dogs.
Such mechanisms of structural violence have a social-psychological dimension that
includes an emotional realm. Certain instruments of power exploit emotional vulnerabilities
regarding their weaknesses, desires, tendencies, and aspirations. One insidious form of power is
a capacity to manipulate the thought processes of others, to deceptively induce them to
“voluntarily” act in ways that serve the agents’ best interests and against those of the deceived
group. Psychological power comes in many forms, where an individual or group can coercive,
cajole, compel, or threaten others. Such power comes in techniques designed to blind, deceive,
and distort the thoughts of large population groups. I offer two case studies of this emotionpower entanglement.
A. Case study of systemic humiliation. This is one form of state-power designed to
exploit the psyche of a targeted population group and diminish their self-esteem through a
poisonous self-debasement (Lukes, 2005, pp. 27-28). The technique of manufactured degradation
and self-degradation of such a group includes fabricated images of their incompetence,
ignorance, or worthlessness. Such imagery illustrates the insidious force of systemic humiliation.
The impact of such a force goes beyond the psychological pain associated with an individual’s
insults. With systemic humiliation, the targeted group members are cast as lesser beings, as if
carrying a taint that cannot be removed by donning new clothes, amassing wealth, or exhibiting
unusual talents. Such degradation is manufactured to position, or re-position, such group
members as diminished people.10 In other words, systems of humiliation cause violence to their

In general, one’s position represents one’s place in a social or political order as determined by
the set of moral rights and obligations afforded to them in relation to others (Harré &
Moghaddam, 2003, chapter 1).
10
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social or political existence by maligning their position in society. They are cast as being
unworthy of the rights, esteem, and status others enjoy. A racial, religious, or nationalistic group
who feel inferior to high power groups are less likely to complain, obstruct, resist, or rebel
against authority figures, or so the agents of degradation think. The targeted group members
might even contribute to their own debasement by exhibiting discriminatory behavior against
other members of their group. Such techniques are rationalized by appeals to the universal norms
of decency, civility, or security that all right-thinking people cherish.
Psychologists have shown that such debasement can be painful. Recent studies of neuroprocessing confirm this correlation between social rejection and psychic pain as a prelude to
aggression. In these studies, a group of experimental subjects were induced to experience social
exclusion similar to what occurs in ethnic bigotry. When these subjects experienced feelings of
being forcibly ostracized from a social group, the regions activated in the brain are associated
with a painful physical injury. These regions are the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior
insula (Eisenberger, 2012; Eisenberger et al., 2003). In sum, a system of humiliation consists of
instruments of affect power designed to foster a sense of inferiority in a population for garnering
their obedience, cooperation, or even their complicity in the overall stability of the high power
group.
Ample references to systemic humiliation are found in the writings of scholars, authors
and activists exposing the patterns of racism. For example, Franz Fanon examined the pernicious
impact of manufactured inferiority induced by colonial white society, linking Blackness to
images of animals, slaves, or beasts (Fanon, 1967, p. 98). In his Letter from a Birmingham Jail,
M. L. King reveals the manufactured debasement Jim Crow laws fostered, with the effect of
creating among Negros a “degenerating sense of Nobodiness” in the eyes of Whites. Malcolm X
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implored Blacks to expunge from their souls the poison of inferiority they received and ingested
from the hands of White Supremacists; he called on Blacks to realize the truth of their
supremacy. Cornell West offers a graphic image of this poisonous self-debasement as follows:
“To Niggerize a people is to make them afraid and ashamed and scared and intimidated, so that
they are deferential to the powers that be” (2014, p. 15).
Consider the practice of racial profiling, which police officers often defend as a valuable
technique for apprehending potential criminals. The evidence that young black male youths
receive harsh treatment from local police officers is quite compelling. Many studies offer similar
findings of mistreatment (Brunson, 2007; Carr et al., 2007). For example, one study of inner city
black youths living in St. Louis revealed accounts of unwarranted physical assaults by police
officers (Gau & Brunson, 2010). In another study, 90 black men from Georgia were asked about
their experiences with police. More than half of them, that is 50, recounted negative experiences
(English et al., 2017, p. 193-194). Their testimonies described verbal abuse such as name calling
and threats, physical abuse, and unfair arrests. They expressed anger for being treated unfairly
combined with feelings of being over-powered by racialized practices. Such feelings are
illustrated in the following testimony:
I felt like you know when I was approached and uh, arrested. I felt like I was uh, what’s
the word to look for, it, it was excessive force . . . I uh tried to ask questions about why I
was being approached and I was physically a . . . a . . . abused. Because of that . . . you
know I was uh, considered as being a smart ass and uh, thrown on the . . . thrown on the
concrete and scratched. You know, face pressed down into the asphalt, and you know,
scratched my face up and everything, and, and thrown in the car and arrested. And I just
felt like it’s definitely because I was black.
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Former police officer, Tony Gaskew validated this testimony of strategic humiliation by
admitting his invisible job was to humiliate young black men. Superiors instructed him “to
humiliate their family, friends, and community either by legal fear of arrest and asset forfeiture,
or by the most powerful weapon in my arsenal: planting cultural doubt. That is, doubt in your
ability to trust family and friends and doubt in their ability to trust you” (Gaskew, 2014, p. 90).
Such humiliation is both individualistic and collective; particular Black men experience it
and others who strongly object to this practice as an assault on ‘our’ people. In Figure 2, this is
captured by locating such emotion in both region 1 (individual experience) and 2 (collective
experience).
To be sure, not all cases of systemic humiliation lead to a sense of shame experienced by
the targeted individuals. Some cases are so subtle and disguised that even the degraded group
members are unaware of their subjugation. Consider the processes of categorical erasure, where
certain targeted individuals are physically present in a social space but socially invisible. They
are seen as bodies that move, but not socially recognized as worthy of esteem. Such positioning
constitutes a form of categorical erasure within a social environment. In some social
environments, such erasure can have lethal consequences.
Consider the treatment of female patients in health care. Women experience a categorical
erasure in health care in clinical research studies, preventive treatments, and medical care
services. Yet, many of them are unaware of such erasure and lack the emotions the cases of
racial profiling experienced above. In particular, there is overwhelming evidence of sexdifferences in the frequency, causes, and intensity of coronary heart disease (CHD). This disease
strikes women at a higher rate than men. In 2017, about one in every 16 women aged 20 and
older has this disease, representing 6.2% of this population group. Also, CHD is the leading
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cause of death among women in the US; CHD caused one in every five female deaths in 2017
(Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018: Saving Lives, Protecting People,
https://www.cdc.gov/heartdisease/women.htm). The cumulative risk of women between the ages
of 50 and 94 of dying from CHD is 31%. Within CHD, 42% of women who have acute coronary
syndrome will die within one year. In contrast, 24% of men who have this syndrome will die
within one year (American Heart Association, 2017).
However, many physicians continue to erroneously believe in gender neutrality regarding
the treatment of CHD, which reflects “de-gendered” health care for this disease. This belief is
conjoined with the tacit understanding men represent the standard frame of reference for
diagnosing and treating CHD. This male-dominated standardization is evident in medical studies,
which has led to women being routinely underrepresented in clinical trials (Xhyheri &
Bugiardini, 2010, p. 227-228). Regarding their treatment, women undergo fewer medical
procedures in the health care system for CHD than men. For example, men are more likely to be
admitted to coronary care units where women exhibit the same set of symptoms (Xhyheri &
Bugiardini, 2010, p. 232). Also, men are twice as likely as women to receive certain medical
treatments after being diagnosed for CHD, even though women show symptoms for this disease
as often (Ayanian & Epstein, 1991).
B. Rage. One form of affect power increasingly common among political pundits,
activists, and politicians is righteous rage. We have witnessed such rage among right-wing radio
hosts such as Rush Limbaugh and Alex Jones railing on democratic political figures. In 2016,
Presidential Candidate Donald Trump induced a collective rage among his jeering supporters
with chants “Lock her up!” Left-wing activities also display this emotion, as illustrated by the
recent protests against the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The display of
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righteous rage is exhibited by a few protestors who destroyed property, looted stores, and
physically confronted police and the National Guard. As one protester laments, “I’m angry, I’m
sad, I’m sick, I’m scared for my children” (Washington Post, June 4, 2020, p. B1).
The activists that exhibit rage in a public space garner political capital to induce potential
compatriots to act. Such a performative comes with a political force, like a contagion, that
sweeps over like-minded or like-feeling people. Such a force reflects the activists’ political
capital to mobilize others in a shared struggle. As a result, networks are formed, resources
gathered, and strategies developed. In cases of outright political rebellion, the emotional
contagion includes disdain, righteous indignation, or hatred. A public expression of rage has
normative import, as if to convey the message, “If you are not angry, you’re not paying
attention.” This message implies the political opponents of the enraged person exhibit willful
ignorance to the injustice in “our” midst. In certain respects, the enraged person is perceived to
be immune to refutation. Nobody else can challenge ‘my’ suffering, which tacitly presents a
sense of infallibility to their explanation. A person who appears sincere about their rage acquires
a rhetorical authority about their political stance. In other words, their rage reflects an
entanglement of the so-called inward emotions and outward behavior in a political struggle. This
inner-outer duality is confusingly blended in the expression of affect power.
Rage can be institutionalized. For some grass-roots movements seeking social justice,
rage defines their identity. For example, in the United States the Righteous Rage Institute for
Social Justice adopts the mission “to create an educational pathway and pipeline of emerging
Social Justice Leaders and Grassroots Community Organizers” (Accessed June 1, 2020.
https://operations.du.edu/irise/project-righteousrageinstitute). For activists of this institute, their
rage is both politicized in their mission and rationalized by their sense of moral indignation at
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patterns of systemic injustice that target certain population groups. This social group defines
themselves as enraged righteously in seeking to combat systems of oppression. This integration
of individual “subjective” emotions and universal norms for justice illustrate the emotion-power
entanglement. The righteous rage conveys a sense of being both objective given its grounding in
the presumable reality of social injustice and subjectively embodied among those who are
enraged. Such embodiment adds to the sense of authenticity of the experience, as if the enraged
person experiences the injustice in ‘my’ soul, body, and very being. Such emotional expressions
have emotional capital, which refers to the capacity to exert an influence through the display of
emotions (Heaney, 2019, p. 234). In recent years, certain political figures have sought to harness
increased emotional capital for garnering political capital. As Jonathan Heaney writes: “there is a
new emotional logic operating within the field of politics, and . . . this is based upon the
transformation or conversion of emotional capital to political capital (Heaney, 2019, p. 234).

Conclusion
We should abandon the conventional assumption that the realm of emotions of actors
engaged in protracted violent conflict is fundamentally walled off from their power relations. In
public spaces, moral emotions such as hatred, anger, and disdain can spread like a contagion
among the conflict actors and their supporters. State governments can manufacture such a force
artificially, as illustrated in the mechanisms for systemic humiliation. In reaction to such
governmental campaigns, the enraged victim of such targeted humiliation can garner political
capital through emotionally charged rhetoric that induces, motivates, and mobilizes their
followers. All of which reflect the impact of affect power.
The implications of these findings for conflict analysis are significant. They include:
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(1) Structurally violent systems have an emotional dimension.
(2) The power relations among actors engaged in a protracted violent conflict are
entangled with the sociality of emotions, which means the political life of conflict actors impacts
their emotional experiences and such experiences carry a political force.
(3) The sociality of emotions is definable by three elements—the moralistic import of
social emotions, their enculturation, and their contagion force.
(4) In settings of protracted violence, such a force has political import.
(5) State governments can exploit such a contagion in their campaigns to contort the
thought processes and emotional life of targeted population groups.
(6) For the low power group members, such a force is realized in the emotional contagion
of public performatives.
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